The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds by Lee, Yvonne C. L.
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 6
Number 1 Winter 2010 Article 5
Winter 1-1-2010
The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign
Wealth Funds
Yvonne C. L. Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yvonne C. L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 Hastings Bus. L.J. 197 (2010).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol6/iss1/5
THE GOVERNANCE OF
CONTEMPORARY SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS
Yvonne C. L. Lee*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent contemporary sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs")
developments, viewed against the historical backdrop of international law
and practice, particularly foreign investment law and practice, underscore
the inter-action between economics, law and politics. The increasing
prominence of SWFs with their recently acquired portfolio stake-holdings
in North American and Western European corporations at distressed prices,
attracted both fascination and flak in the global financial world. These
SWFs, as the "new kids on the block", along with other institutional
investors such as hedge funds and insurance companies, are mostly from
'non-Western' countries such as China, Russia, Singapore, and United
Arab Emirates. Governments of certain recipient countries such as the U.S.,
Italy and France, have raised the spectre of SWFs as smoking guns with
investment strategies that threaten the nation's national security. Their
rhetoric is ironically reminiscent of arguments advanced by developing
countries against the "free trade and market" and "freedom of capital flows
and investment" argument of developed countries. This reversal of roles
corresponds with the change in the direction of capital flows from 'non-
Western' countries to Western markets. In an attempt to allay fears and
obtain mutual understanding and broad consensus, two dominant interest
groups, the SWFs as investors and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") and recipient countries have issued
the Generally Agreed Principles and Practices' (the "Santiago Principles")
embodying guidelines for SWFs' internal management and investment
objectives, and the Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore; LL.M. (Michigan),
LL.B. (NUS); Attorney & Counsellor (New York State), Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore). Email:
yvonneleecl@gmail.com. The author acknowledges the support of the Ministry of Education, Singapore
(Academic Research Fund No. R-241-000-067-l 12).
1. Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds Generally Accepted
Principles and Practices (Oct. 2008), available at:
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf. [hereinafter "Santiago Principles"].
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Country Policies, General Investment Policy, Guidelines for Recipient
Country Investment Policies relating to National Security and Freedom of
Investment Process: Preserving the Foundations of Global Prosperity and
Development (collectively, the "OECD's Recipient Country Policies")2
respectively.
This article first introduces the issues that have emerged as a result of
SWFs contemporary investments and observes how SWFs and recipient
countries have reacted to these developments. It proposes a model of SWF
governance based on consultation, cooperation and coordination. This
model draws on the experience of current deliberative fora such as the G20
summits and the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
International Monetary Fund's forum, the bilateral arrangements between
countries and the laws and practices of some SWF countries, particularly
Singapore. This article further examines the oversight regimes to which
Singapore SWFs are subject, and recommends the approach of the
Singapore SWFs as a starting point for achieving an optimal balance
between nationalism and global financial stability based on free capital and
investment flows.
II. SWFS: BENIGN INVESTORS OR SMOKING GUNS?
A. THE RISE OF CONTEMPORARY SWFS
Governments generally manage public wealth under the relevant
ministries of finance and central banks. The holding and investment
strategies are usually conservative with an emphasis on liquidity and safe,
low-yielding assets. Contemporary SWFs,3 particularly 'non-western' ones,
with their diversity of investment holdings and focus on assets with higher
yields and risks therefore constitute a recent development. Such SWFs are
rich sources of capital' with investment strategies beyond the purchase of
foreign currencies and government bonds.' Table 1 below illustrates the
2. OECD Investment Committee, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Receipient Countries - Working
together to maintain and expand freedom of investment (Oct. 11, 2008), available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/23/41456730.pdf. [hereinafter "OECD"].
3. Kuwait Investment Authority is the first known SWF, created in 1953 to reduce the country's
reliance on oil, as it is a non-renewable resource. See MARTIN A. WEISS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS:
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT,
RL34336 (January 15, 2009), at 4, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34336_20090115.pdf.
4. See Id. (noting that the Largest Funds by Assets Under Management comprises mostly of non-
western countries totaling an estimated total fund size of US$3,652.7 billion).
5.See, e.g., Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar, Strange rise of Eastern neo-colonialism,
THE TIMES OF INDIA, January 28, 2008, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Columnists/Strange-rise-of Eastemneo-
colonialism/articleshow/2714753.cms. (discussing the change in global financial power with the rise of
non-Western SWFs and the corresponding increased flow of funds to Western countries).
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different 'types' of assets controlled by governments:
TABLE 1: STATE 'CONTROLLED' ASSETS6
STATE 'CONTROLLED' ASSETS
OFFICIAL PENSION FUNDS (E.G., TRANSFERS FROM
FOREIGN FUNDS OFFICIAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE
EXCHANGE RESERVES, DERIVED FROM
RESERVES COMMODITY EXPORTS, SALE OF
DOMESTIC ASSETS, FISCAL
SURPLUSES)
External Investment State-owned Sovereign wealth funds
assets held by vehicles enterprises
central (constituted
bank(s) under private
or public laws)
To finance To meet To encourage Depends on objectives and
international pension or stimulate funding: higher returns on
payment obligations domestic surpluses, pension
imbalances industries and obligations, domestic
sectors industry stimulation, future
generations
Highly liquid Conservative Companies Investment vehicles to
with low risk, investment which (1) facilitate economic
often portfolios, typically have development in home
government low risk single states; and/or
bonds appetite with business (2) invest in foreign
high yields objectives assets
Higher risk appetite
The state has The state has The state has The state has minimal to
significant some control. significant significant control
control Most funds control (management/operation).
have external (management Some funds have
professional / operation) external professional
managers managers.
e.g., US e.g., Norway e.g., China e.g., U.S. (Alaska), Abu
(Federal (Government (CNOOC) and Dhabi (Mubadala), China
Reserve) Pension Fund) Singapore (CIC and SAFE) and
(Singapore Singapore (GIC and
Airlines) Temasek)
6. Adapted from ADNAN HASSAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, Exh. 3.11
(2009).
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The term "SWF" includes a diverse group of entities of different
constitutive characteristics and investment objectives such as funds,
pension schemes, state enterprises in home countries and investment
vehicles constituted under foreign laws.' According to the Santiago
Principles, SWFs are "special purpose investment funds or arrangements"
created out of "balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency
operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts
resulting from commodity exports" and owned by the central government
for "macroeconomic purposes."'
In the past, developed countries were the primary net exporters of
capital. A reversal of economic fortunes and a change in the direction of
capital flows has however occurred.' Since 2005, several "non-Western"
countries with economies ranging from advanced to developing, such as
China, India, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and United Arab
Emirates, have benefited from escalated oil prices and the exponential
growth of emerging markets. 0 Their recent acquisitions of Western
financial institutions such as Barclays, Citigroup, UBS and Merrill Lynch,"
during the U.S. sub-prime crisis have attracted significant flak and
fascination from certain politicians and governments in recipient countries,
7. See IMF, Sovereign Wealth Funds - A Work Agenda, Feb. 29, 2008 at 5, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf
8. Santiago Principles, supra note 1, at 27. See also IMF, Global Financial Stability Report-
Financial Market Turbulence, Sep. 2007, at 45, available at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf, (particularly Chapter 1);
Commonwealth Secretariat, "Sovereign Wealth Funds - Issue Note", Sep. 2008 at 2, available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/183308/FileName/FMM_08_INF.2.pdf; Sovereign Wealth
Fund Institute Inc., http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf.php.
9. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the
Infrastructure Challenge September 24, 2008, at 2 tbl.1, available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008overview-en.pdf. Id. at 10. (discussing the relation of the
inflows and outflows of foreign direct investments amongst developed economies and developing
economies such as Asia. Foreign direct investment outflows from South, East and South-East Asia
reached a new high amounting to US$150 billion reflecting the growing importance of developing
countries as outward investors. Foreign direct investment outflows from West Asia increased for the
fourth consecutive year to US$44 billion in 2007 - nearly six times its level in 2004).
10. See, e.g., McKinsey Global Institute, The New Power Brokers: How Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds
and Private Equity Are Shaping Global Capital Markets Oct. 2007, 22, Exh. 1.2,available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/The NewPower_Brokers/index.asp.
I1. In 2007, China Investment Corporation acquired US$3 billion stake in Blackstone Group;
Dubai's Istihmar wins the bid for Barneys New York; Mubadala Development Company owned by the
Abu Dhabi government purchased 7.5% stake in Carlyle Group for US$1.35 billion; Dubai
International Capital's purchase of a US$1.26 billion stake in hedge fund Och-Ziff Capital Management
Group; Citic Securities, China's state-controlled investment bank, invested US$1 billion in Bear
Stearns; Abu Dhabi Investment Authority purchased 4.9% stake in Citigroup for US$7.5 billion; Dubai
International Capital, owned by the ruler of Dubai, acquired a minority stake in Sony; Singapore's GIC
invested II billion Swiss francs in Swiss private bank UBS.
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notably, those from U.S., France and Italy. Indeed, the launch of the new
China Investment Corporation, Ltd, with then US$200 billion of capital,
was one of the first events that attracted Western interest in SWFs.12
Two key concerns about SWF investments, the lack of transparency
and ominous investment strategy, have been raised by politicians in
recipient countries such as the U.S:
A lack of transparency that characterizes many sovereign wealth
funds undermines the theory of efficient markets at the heart of
our economic system. In addition, unlike private investors,
pension funds and mutual funds, government owned-entities may
have interests that will take precedence over profit maximization.
Just as the United States has geopolitical interests in addition to
financial ones, so do other countries. Just as we value some
things more than money, so do they. Why should we assume that
other nations are driven purely by financial interests when we are
not?"
Figure 1 below maps these concerns in relation to specific SWFs; the
X axis and Y axis reflect the degree of transparency and the stated or
perceived nature of the investment philosophy. SWFs that fall within the
upper-left quadrant attract heightened concern from recipient countries.14
Recipient countries have generally put forward Norway's SWF as the
universal model of accountability and transparency that adequately
addresses fears of a rogue SWF being used to further its home country's
government's political agenda. This is ironical given that the investment
strategies of Norway's SWF are directly affected by its ethical guidelines
that embody several substantive norms which have the force of law in
Norway, and are contested in other jurisdictions, as further mentioned in
the sections below.
12. Weiss, supra note 3, at 2 n.5.
13. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government Investments in the
US.: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 11Oth Cong. (2007). See also Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make
the U.S. Economy Stronger or Pose National Security Risks: Hearing on S. 110-499 Before Joint Econ,
Comm., I 10th Cong. (2008).
14. Weiss, supra note 3, at 8.
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Figure 1: Ranking of SWFs by Investment Approach and
Transparency
Lee iaTransparency
Low HIgh
Source: Standard Chartered and Oxford Analytica, as cited by Gerard Lyons, Prepared Statement inThe Rise of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy and Economic Interests (Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of
Representatives, U.S., May 21, 2008) (No. 110-190) at p, 13.
Although some cautioned against unwarranted nationalistic and
protectionist reactions against SWFs, others called for a defense of national
interests against a perceived loss of sovereignty and economic espionage.
One example of an apparent protectionist reaction is the setting up of a
French strategic investment fund of 20 billion euros (US$25 billion) in
November 2008. The fund's investment focus is distinctively domestic,
compared to the foreign and domestic mixed focus of other SWFs." A
primary concern is that a recipient country's national security and
economic interests would be compromised if SWFs which are controlled
15. Helene Fouquet and James G Neuger, Sarkozy Calls for EU Funds to Buy Cut-Price Shares,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 21, 2008) at 1, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a.Zf8XBnAa6c&refer-europe. See also
Ben Hall, Sarkozy puts 20bn barrier around industry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008,available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3da72ee6-b2Of-llde-a271-00144feab49a.html?nclickcheck=1.
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by the respective foreign governments, invest in corporations within
defense, key infrastructure and technologies industries." SWFs as foreign
government entities, are often viewed as investors with deep pockets who
distort capital markets by competing from an unfair position and who are
driven by interests that differ from purportedly safer interests of non-
government investors. Several further assert that SWFs, though similar to
hedge funds without long-term investment objectives, are less transparent
than hedge funds and therefore more ominous." Such opinions
unjustifiably gloss over the levels of secrecy and accountability enjoyed by
so-called private investors such as private equity funds, hedge funds and
investment banks." There has been no evidence of national security
violations or economic espionage thus far; the jury is still out.
B. REACTIONS OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
While most concerned States may not call for an outright ban on the
inflows and outflows of capital per se, they have sought greater restrictions
on investment inflows to sectors with potential national security
implications or financial market systems vulnerable to being reshaped by
foreign government intervention.' These protective restrictions differ from
existing securities disclosure laws that apply to both domestic and foreign
investors, such as Section 16 of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 193420
requires any person that directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of any
U.S. registered class of equity securities, to disclose its interest and any
change thereof within two business days.
One form of ex ante protective measures implemented by recipient
countries is the blanket prohibition of foreign stake-holdings in domestic
companies above a specified threshold percentage. SWFs, are for example,
16. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, The Rise of Sovereign
Business, Gauer Distinguished Lecture in Law and Policy at the American Enterprise Institute Legal
Center for the Public Interest (Dec. 5, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071206_ChairmanCoxSpeech.pdf).
17. Edwin M Truman, Four Myths About Sovereign Wealth Funds, VOXEuAug. 14,
2008,available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?qmnode/1 539.
18. David Cho, Hedge Funds Mystify Markets, Regulators - Deeply Powerful, Largely Unchecked,
WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 4, 2007,availabe at http://www.washingtonpost.convwp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/03/AR2007070302240.html(explaining the largely unregulated and
understood hedge funds which are responsible for more than one third of stock trades and control more
than US$2 trillion worth of assets). See also Kavaljit Singh, SWFs mark structural shift in world
financial order, THE ECON. TINIES (INDIA), Nov. 11, 2008 available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Comments-Analysis/SWFs-mark-structural-shift-in-
world-financial-order-/articleshow/3697765.cms.
19. Kathryn C. Lavelle, The Business of Governments: Nationalism in the Context ofSovereign
Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises, 62 J.INT'L AFF. 131, 131-32 (2008).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2008).
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prohibited from buying more than 5% of individual Italian companies.2
This blanket threshold threatens the freedom of investments and curtails the
exchange of capital without any contextualized examination of possible
risks posed by each specific potential SWF investment.
Another form of ex ante protective measures is the review of foreign
investment.22 Typically, these reviews are conducted when foreign
investments exceed a specified stake-holding percentage or draws national
security concerns. For example, the Investment Canada Act of 1985 and its
regulations stipulate that foreign direct investments and indirect
investments valued at C$5 million and C$50 million respectively, must be
reviewed "to ensure that such investment "contributes to economic growth
and employment opportunities" of Canada. The threshold for WTO
member countries are higher, e.g., C$312 million and C$5 million for most
industries and certain sensitive industries respectively.23 In France,
acquisitions irrespective of size or the nationality, involving "sensitive"
sectors such as private security services, production of chemical or
biological antidotes, defense and military services are subject to prior
approval by the Finance Minister.24 Foreign investments in the U.S. are
subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investments ("CFIUS")
pursuant to the U.S Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 200725
which amended the Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950.26
CFIUS is generally required to review acquisitions by foreign persons of
control2 7 of U.S entity-broadly majority ownership or dominant minority
of total voting interests or board representation, or special contractual
arrangements, to ensure that such acquisitions do not threaten "national
security". Currently, the U.S. regulations exempt from CFIUS review
passive investments and establish a "safe harbour" for acquisitions of 10 %
or less of an U.S. company's voting securities.2 8
21. Guy Dinmore, Italy set to curb sovereign wealth funds, FIN. TIMES (London) Oct. 21,
2008,available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news id=fto102020082244117441.
22. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING
INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES (2008), GAO-08-320, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf.
23. Investment Canada Act, R.S., ch. 1-28(1985), available at http://www.ic.gc.caleic/site/ica-
lic.nsf/eng/h_1k00071 .html.
24. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREA OF ECON., ENERGY AND BUS. AFF., 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE
- FRANCE (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009. (referencing Decree 2005-
1739 of Dec. 30, 2005).
25. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-049, 121 Stat. 248
(2007) (amending the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment, Pub. L. No. 102-99, 150 Stat. 487 (1988) (50
U.S.C. App. § 2170) to the 1950 Defense Production Act).
26. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2007).
27. Current CFlUS regulations define "control" functionally, in terms of the ability of the acquirer
to make certain important decisions affecting the acquired entity. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2008).
28. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(d)(1) (2008). For an overview ofCFIUS, see U.S. Treasury - Office,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/overview.shtm. Recent passive SWF
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These forms of ex ante protective measures arguably violate relevant
provisions in bilateral agreements that protect foreign investments in
recipient countries under "national treatment" and "most-favored-nation
treatment" principles.29 Unlike the usual laws that limit foreign ownership
in sensitive sectors such as aviation, banking, telecommunications, media
and military industries in numerous states, percentage restrictions are pre-
emptive and apply to all sectors.
C. RESPONSES OF SWF COUNTRIES
SWF countries have rejected recipient countries' promotion of
Norway's SWF as the universal model for best accountability and
transparency standards that should be adopted by the other SWFs. SWF
countries prefer instead, the adaptation of guidelines which are broad and
comparable to those set for private equity and hedge funds. In response to
mounting criticisms and calls by the International Monetary and Financial
Committee ("IMFC")o, twenty two countries established an International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds ("IWG")" and issued twenty
four voluntary principles concerning SWFs' governance, accountability
and investment conduct, in October 2008.32 The guiding purpose of the
Santiago Principles is "to have in place a transparent and sound governance
structure that provides for adequate operational controls, risk management
and accountability; ensure compliance with applicable regulatory and
disclosure requirements in the countries in which SWFs invest; ensure
SWFs invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related
considerations; and. help maintain a stable global financial system and free
flow of capital and investment."" The composition of IWG is broadly
investments were purportedly not subject to CFIUS review on this basis, such as, Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority's purchase of 4.9% of Citigroup and Singapore's Temasek Holdings' purchase of
9.4% of Merrill Lynch.
29. See, e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sin., art. 10, §§ 2-3, May 6,
2003, 108 P.L. 78 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/FinalTexts/assetupload_file
708_4036.pdf(articles providing for national treatment and most favored nation treatment where each
party shall accord to investors of the other party treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its
own investors in respect of inter alia investments in its own financial institutions).
30. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, COMMUNIQUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
(16th Sess. 2007) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2007/102007a.htm, and (17th Sess.
2008) available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/cm/2008/041208.htm.
31. Press Release, Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working Group
of Sovereign Wealth Funds is Established to Facilitate Work on Voluntary Principles (May 1, 2008),
available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr080l.htm.
32. Santiago Principles, supra note 1.
33. Press Release, Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working Group
of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the "Santiago Principles" to the International Monetary and
Financial Committee (Oct. 11, 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr8O6.htm.
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representative of a wide range of countries and interests. Its members
comprise mostly countries with SWFs which investments have caused
some concerns among recipient countries and countries with SWFs but
have been recipients of such investments such as Australia and the U.S.34
The inclusion of the OECD and the World Bank, together with Oman,
Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam as permanent observers, and the current
involvement of David Murray, Chairman of Australia's Future Fund Board
of Guardians, as the chair; and Jin Liqun, Chairman of the Board of
Supervisors, China Investment Corporation, and Bader Mohammad Al-
Sa'ad, Managing Director, Kuwait Investment Authority, as the deputy
chairs, collectively boost the legitimacy of IWG's objectives.
The Santiago Principles have been welcomed in principle by many
recipient countries. For example, as discussed below, the OECD which had
given its input to the making of the Santiago Principles reaffirmed the
content of such principles in the OECD's Recipient Country Policies.35
Independent evaluations of SWFs such as the scoreboard drawn up by
Truman36 have motivated certain governments to boost existing levels of
accountability and transparency for their SWFs' operations and
investments. For example, in response to the then low ranking of Singapore
SWFs by Truman, the Singapore Government assured the parliamentarians
that it was engaged "in talks with the US authorities" and that Truman had
sought its "inputs."" The continued economic crisis and the consequent
significant realized or paper losses of Singapore SWF present and past
investments, particularly U.S. portfolios such as Barclays,38 Citigroup,
Inc.3 ' and Merrill Lynch (recently, taken over by Bank of America),40 have
34. The members are Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial
Guinea, Iran, Ireland, Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore,
Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, The United Arab Emirates, and United States. See International
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://www.ifswf.org.
35. OECD, supra note 2.
36. See Edwin M. Truman, in A Scoreboard for Sovereign Wealth Funds, PETTERSON INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Oct. 19, 2007,available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/trumanI007swf.pdf; and Edwin M. Truman, A Blueprint for
Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices, PETTERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, APR.
2008, (POLICY BRIEF No. 08-3),available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-
3.pdf. See other 'scoreboards' such as the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, infra note 161;studies
by Lyons and Oxford Analytica, ERIC C. ANDERSON, TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN -
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE DEMISE OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY, Ch. 4,
2009). The underlying basis of each scoreboard is however not uncontested and can be criticized for
generalization, opaque use of source information and over and under inclusion.
37. See 84 PARL. DEB., SG., (9th ser.) (2003) 1763, available at:
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20080303/20080303S0003_TOOO1.htm
l#1.(referencing speech by Second Minister of Finance, Lim Hwee Hua in Parliamentary Debates.
38. See, e.g., Steve Slater, Singapore's Temasek sold Barclay's stake, REUTERS, Jun. 3, 2009.
(according to calculations by Reuters, Temasek might have lost over 800 million pounds (US$1.3
billion) after purchasing the shares for more than I billion pounds).
39. See, e.g., Grace Ng, GIC Pumps $9.8b into Troubled Citigroup, THE STRAITS TIMES
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led to repeated calls for a substantive review of their global and regional
investment strategies.4 1
As the global economy further deteriorated in the third quarter of
2008 and first half of 2009, many of the recipient countries abandoned the
rhetoric of national security and sovereignty, and renewed their courtship
of SWF investments.4 2 SWFs are however re-assessing their investment
holdings and strategies. Financial analysts estimate that the SWF assets
under management have dropped from some US$3,600 billion (end of
2007) to US$3,000 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2009.43 The
SWFs' varied responses to the economic crisis comprise the postponement
of investments, sale of investments with materially diminished expected
returns, and new focus in emerging markets or non-financial industries
which afford higher dividend returns." The ostensible recovery of the
global economy in the last two quarters of 2009, particularly the oil
industries of the Middle East, emerging markets of China and India, and
property-and infrastructure sectors of certain Asian countries such as Hong
Kong and Singapore, will further shape the investment strategies and
responses of SWFs and recipient countries respectively.
(SINGAPORE), Jan. 15, 2008,available at http://www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_196596.html
(last visited September 2009).
40. See, e.g., Saskia Scholtes and Greg Farrell, Singapore state fund counts Merrill losses, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), Jan 8, 2009 at 18. (discussing losses from investments: "The state agency's
unrealised losses could amount to more than US$2 billion, excluding any hedges"). Temasek's
stakeholding has recently been sold due to its investment focus shift from developed countries to
emerging markets. See Temasek Holdings (Sale of Bank ofAmerica Shares), 86 PARL. DEB., SG.,(5th
Ser.) (2009), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20090528/20090528 S0005_T0004.html#l.
41. See, e.g., Debate on Annual Budget, 85 PARL. DEB., SG.,(14th Ser.) (2009), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/get-highlighted-content.jsp?doclD=54363 I &hlLevel=Terms&li
nks=ANNUAL,BUDGET&hlWords= &hlTitle=annual
budget&queryOption=1&ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/fullI20090205/2
0090205_HR.html#l. (where it was observed that the collective losses incurred by GIC and Temasek
were estimated to be S$50 billion).
42. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, SWFs'Lose Their Appetite, FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2009); Fiona
Chan, Citi asking US govt, GIC to up direct stakes, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore) (Feb. 24, 2009); China
set to invest again in Europe, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090526/BUSINESS/705269932/1137; Wayne Arnold, Abu Dhabi
Sovereign Wealth Funds Most Welcome, THE NATIONAL (May 26, 2009); Stanley Carvalho, UK open to
investment from SWFs - minister, ARABIAN BUSINESS.COM. Apr. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/552020-uk-open-to-investment-from-swfs-to-bolster-economy-
minister; Mohammed Nafaa, US Treasury Secretary Visits Saudi Arabia, AL-SHORFA, Jul. 22, 2009,
http://www.al-shorfa.com/en/article/090722-reassurancenws/.
43. David Oakley, Sovereign wealth funds suffer sharp falls, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2009, at 21.
44. See, e.g., Qatar fund puts off investments, GULF DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=245548.
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III. A MODEL OF GOVERNANCE: CONSULTATION,
COOPERATION, COORDINATION
A. BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION
Contemporary SWF investments accentuate the difficulties in
balancing the differing national interests of the SWF and recipient
countries. One country's debit on the foreign reserves balance sheet is after
all another country's credit on its balance sheet. While few deny the mutual
benefit of free trade and investment and flow of capital, perceptions of
undue gain or unfair discrimination at the expense of domestic interests of
recipient and SWF countries respectively continue to surround SWF
investments. Compliance with the investment, securities and disclosure
laws and regulations of recipient countries does not necessarily 'immunize'
SWF investments from threats of nationalistic sentiments.
For example, in January 2006, Temasek together with a group of Thai
investors, purchased an initial of 49.6 % stake in Shin Corp, Thailand's
telecommunications listed company for US$1.9 billion, from then
popularly elected Thai Prime Minister Thaksin and his family.45 The
purchase triggered a mandatory offer for the remaining stake resulting in a
total stake-holding of 96% by the Temasek-led consortium for US$3.8
billion. The change in the telecommunication laws governing the foreign
ownership cap4 6 shortly before Temasek's initial purchase in January 2006
triggered fears of political interference in Thailand's domestic laws and
practices.47 Charges of corruption and market manipulation were made
against Thaksin48 resulting in nationalistic sentiments against a sell-out of
vital national assets.49 A military coup occurred and Thaksin was toppled as
prime minister in September 2006. Subsequently, Temasek diluted its stake
45. Bryan Lee, Temasek partners complete Shin Corp takeover, THE STRAIT TIMES (SINGAPORE),
March 15, 2006, available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edulprint.asp?parentid=40982.
46. The Thai TELECOMMUNICATION ACT (2006) raising the limit on foreign holdings in telecom
companies to 49% became effective on January 23, 2006.. The Act replaced the Telecom Business
Law, which took effect in November 2001, and put the foreign investment cap at 25%. Angela Tan,
Temasek's Stake in Thai Bank Under Scrutiny, Bus. TIMES (SINGAPORE), Apr. 6, 2006; Kularb Kaew
Has 1 Year to Cut Non-Thai Shareholding, NATION (THAILAND), Jan. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/1 0/headlines/headlines_30023754.php.
47.Bidhya Bowomwathana, Thaksin's model ofgovernment reform: Prime Ministerialisation through
"a country is my company" approach, 12 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 135 (2004).
48. See, e.g., John Burton, Shin Corp losses hit Temasek after coup, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Sep.
22, 2006, at 7.; John Burton, Singapore may see worst fallout from Thai coup, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
Sep. 20, 2006. See also Temasek 'may have overstepped ownership laws' in Shin Deal, BUS. TIMES
(SINGAPORE), Oct. 3, 2006; Thai probe turns up heat on Temasek's Shin deal, STRAITS TIMES
(SINGAPORE), Oct. 2, 2006.
49. Leslie Lopez, Shin Corp deal fallout spooks foreign investors in Thailand, STRAIT TIMES
(SINGAPORE), Nov. 8, 2006.
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in Shin Corp; its stake-holding is now reflected as 42%.o
A second example is the sale of P&O Ports North America to AIG
Global Investment Group by Dubai Ports World ("DPW"), a state owned
company in United Arab Emirates, in March 2007. These ports had already
been foreign-owned by Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company, a British firm taken over by DPW in March 2006."' Although
the takeover had been approved by the executive branch of the U.S.
government, the bipartisan opposition in U.S. Congress was unrelenting in
light of fears that the takeover would compromise U.S. port security.12
Another example of a foreign direct investment in U.S. that attracted
adverse political reaction particularly within the U.S. Congress is China
National Offshore Oil Company Ltd's ("CNOOC") acquisition offer for
Unocal Oil Company. According to a CNOOC spokesperson, "political
pressure" was one of the major reasons for the company to withdraw the
offer."
A recent example is the collapse of a proposed acquisition US$19.5
billion stake in the Australian-British mining giant Rio Tinto Group by
China's state-owned Aluminium Corporation of China.5 4 ,'55 The board of
Rio Tinto Group announced that it would issue new stock and form a joint
venture with its long time rival, the Australian mining giant BHP Billiton,
instead. While the deal collapse can be justified on commercial grounds56,
the deal, which would have been the Chinese government's largest
investment in a Western corporation, incited intense political opposition in
Australia."
50. See TEMASEK HOLDINGS, 2008 ANNUAL TEMASEK REVIEW (2008), available at
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centre-temasek-review.htm..
51. Press Release, DP World, DP World US Asset Sale Complete (Mar. 16, 2007), available at
http://portal.pohub.com/pls/pogprtl/docs/PAGE/DP WORLDWEBSITE/DPWORLDMEDIA_CEN
TRE/MEDIACENTRENEWSRELEASES/NEWSRELEASES_2007/US%20ASSET%20SALE%
20MAR%2016.PDF.
52. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, NY TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2006,at A14.
53. See CNOOC Withdraws Unocal Bid, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,Aug. 3, 2005 available at
http://www.china.org.cn/englishl2005/Aug/137165.htm.
54. Press Release, Chinalco, Rio Tinto withdraws its recommendation for Chinalco transaction
(Jun. 5, 2009), available at http://www.chinalco.com/chinalco/media/releases.,
55. See, e.g., Jamil Anderlini and Sundeep Tucker, Outmanoeuvred, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jun.
11, 2009.
56. See, e.g., Australian Treasurer: Chinese investment is welcome, XINHUA NEWS, Jun. 6,
2009,available at news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/06/content_ I1499364.htm. .
(quoting the Australian Treasurer: "Rio's made their decision and Chinalco's made theirs completely
independent of government."); Chinese ambassador: Chinalco deal "win-win "for Australia-China,
XINHUA NEWS, Jun. 6, 2009 available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-
05/26/content_11437131.htm. (Chinese ambassador trying to reassure Australia that China provided
reassurances that it was not trying to take control of Australia's resources industry through Chinalco's
bid for Rio Tinto.).
57. The political campaigns against the deal coincided with a Senate inquiry into foreign
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Any proposal for the governance or regulation of SWF investments
must tackle the issues underlying the absence of an international regime of
oversight of international financial markets. 8 The question whether there
is any meaningful potential in the regulation of international financial
relations and global capital markets at the level of public international law
remains uncertain.59 First, there is no one unified body that represents a
wide range of countries and diverse interests. There is instead a somewhat
complex and overlapping matrix of actors-standard-setting bodies such as
the Basel Committee, International Organization of Securities
Commissions, and Financial Action Task Force; international economic
organizations such as the IMF, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and World Trade Organization; regional organizations such
as the African Union, European Union, Organization of American States,
Arab League, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation. Second, the jurisdiction and rules
of each actor vary such that the rule-setting and enforcement mechanisms
of such actors depend on the agreement and submission of its members
which are typically, States. Indeed, the area of international investment law
is littered by a series of unsuccessful or marginalized attempts to create
multilateral treaties by international organizations. States are unable to
agree on the rules governing foreign investment.6 0 Consequently,
regulatory power exercised at the level of the nation-state being
economically, politically and legally endowed with sovereignty, constitutes
the primary standard setting and enforcement agency. It is therefore
unlikely for any coherent overarching economic, institutional or legal
framework regulating financial markets particularly involving SWF
investments, to emerge in the near future."
The current global economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the
U.S. financial markets formerly celebrated for their free market ideology
investments by state-owned entities. On 18 March 2009, the Senate referred the following matters to
the Senate Standing Committee on Economics for inquiry and report by 17 July 2009. Parliament of
Australia, Senate, Economic Committees Inquiry, Mar. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.aph.gov.aulsenate/committee/economics-ctte/firb_09/info.htm.
58. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, The International Architecture of Global Financial Markets, 6(3)
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & CoMP. L. 271-88 (1999).
59. See generally, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (Rainer Grote &
Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006).
60. In particular, the failed attempt by OECD to put forward a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment in the 1990s. See, e.g., M. SORNARAJAH, MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2004). In contrast, North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional treaty, contains strong provisions on foreign
investment, provides for a strong investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-MX.,Jan. 1, 1994, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta.
61. See Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Amer, Toward A New Design For International Financial
Regulation, 29 U.PA. J. INT'L. L. 391, 427 (2007).
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has rendered the philosophy of neo-liberalism embodying free markets,
competition, privatization and minimal regulation unfashionable and
untenable.62 The new phenomenon of "state capitalism as opposed to
market capitalism" discards the Western conception of the trade and
foreign investment liberalization, and the minimal role of governments in
the economy, specifically, the Washington Consensus." It affirms instead
the more regulatory approach taken by the governments of 'non-Western'
SWFs towards their own domestic economies.64 While increased
governmental oversight and regulation is necessary to correct the abuses of
domestic financial markets," national and regional regulators seeking to
prevent outflows of capital in the current crisis may wield excessive
prudential regulatory powers. Governments desperate to stem financial
losses have adopted different approaches contrary to the coordinated global
response first espoused at the G20 Washington summit of 2008. Towards
the end of 2008, several Western governments approved various bailout
plans in an attempt to salvage their respective faltering domestic
economies." As the economic crisis deepens, the repeated intervention of
"Western" governments continues," with similar bailout plans
62. Grote and Marauhn, supra note 59. (referencing Peter Nunnenkamp, Liberalisation and
Regulation of International Capital Flows: Where the Opposites Meet for a policy perspective).
Cf, Tony Barber, Guy Dinmore, Ben Hall, Victor Mallet, George Parker, James Politi, Andrew Ward,
Bush Comes Out Fightingfor Free Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at 2;
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight
and Gov. Reform, 111th Cong. (2008) (Testimony of Alan Greenspan) available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081023100438.pdf; Scott Lanman and Steve Matthews,
Greenspan Concedes to 'Flaw' in His Market Ideology, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ah5qh9Up4rlg
63. An initial neo-liberal development policy framework constructed by powerful financial
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and U.S. Treasury. Its main components are fiscal
discipline, tax reform, liberalization of interest rates, trade and foreign investments, a comprehensive
exchange rate and deregulation. See BEHROOZ MORVARIDI, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT, 72-
106, (2008); NARCIS SERRA & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED
(2008).
64. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman & Louise Story, Overseas Investors Buying U.S. Holdings at
Record Pace, NY TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at Al (quoting Prof. Jeffrey E. Garten, Yale School of
Management); as cited by Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345
(2008).
65. See, e.g., Joanna Chung, SEC flaws exposed by Madoffscandal, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb.
13, 2009, at A2. (example of arguably lax regulatory oversight).
66. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon and David Enrich, Devil Is In Bailout's Details Government's
$250 Billion Cash Injection Sparks Welter of Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008, at Al; French
Parliament Approves Massive Bank Rescue Package, AFP (FRANCE), Oct. 15, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j5e7KoujQvFTZuPelTQftEldx-g(360-billlion-euro bank rescue
package); Rescue Plan for UK Banks Unveiled, BBC (LONDON), Oct. 8, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/7658277.stm,-(US$692 billion); German Government Sets
Conditions for Bank Bailout, DEUTSCHE WELLE (GERMANY), Oct. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3725 9 89 ,00.html,-(480 billion Euros).
67. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, Brussels proposes F200bn stimulus, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 26,
2008, available at, http://www.euro2day.gr/ftcomen/126/articles/407527/ArticleFTen.aspx; John
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implemented by Asian68 and Middle Eastern6 countries.
The fact that WTO recently discarded plans to seek a Doha
breakthrough for a new trade deal severely underscores the faltering
political will to avoid protectionist measures narrowly tailored to rescue
domestic economies.70 Groups such as the G-7,7 1 G-20 72 and ASEAN7 ' have
however provided assurances that they would not engage in protectionism.
Still, there is no consensus concerning the nature and type of acts that
amount to harmful protectionism. Indeed, the differing terms of bailouts
granted by each government to struggling industries further accentuate the
existence of protectionism. 74 Since protectionism endangers global trade
Murray Brown, Cautious welcome for Irish recapitalization, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 22, 2008, at
17,( for a brief comparison of the terms of the Irish government's E5.5bn (L5.1 billion) recapitalization,
with the terms of bailout of banks by the UK government (more E50 billion)). See also Daniel Dombey
& Edward Luce, US stimulus clears Congress, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 13, 2009,(economic stimulus
of US$787 billion); U.S. Treas. Dep. Rep., available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/does/transaction-reports/transactions-report-060509.pdf, (the net total
treasury capital purchase amount was US$197,530,948,000 as of Jun. 3, 2009).
68. See, e.g., China unveils massive stimulus plan amid global crisis: Premier calls for confidence,
XINHUA NEWS (CHINA), Mar. 6, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/englishl2009-
03/06/content_10952638.htm; Aditya Suharmoko, Stimulus package approved, raised, JAKARTA POST
(INDONESIA), Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/25/stimulus-
package-approved-raised.html,; Robin Harding, Aso launches $154bn Japan stimulus, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Apr. 10, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6e77956-25b3-11de-be57-
00144feabdcO.html?catid=24&SID=ffO6cdl 74d45/]50dd028041/087d677; Tom Mitchell, Hong Kong
to launch additional stimulus, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 26, 2009, Available at
http://bx.businessweek.com/china-
economy/view?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2FO%2Ff89b6188-4a07-1 Ide-8e7e-
00144feabdcO.html ; Soraya Permatasari and Ranjeetha Pakiam, Malaysia Unveils $16 Billion Stimulus
Amid Slowdown (Updatel), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 10, 2009, available at
http://negocios.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=PLUS%3AMK&sid=ajpAyzGAIH80;
Singapore announces $13.6B stimulus, CNN, Jan. 22, 2009, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/01/22/singapore.stimulus/index.html?eref=editionbusine
ss.
69. See, e.g., Dubai Gets $10 Billion Bailout to Ease Debt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123532630416442781 .html; Saudi stimulus plan to boost demand,
output, ARAB NEWS, Apr. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=121939&d=27&m=4&y=2009&pix=busines
s.jpg&category=Business; Diana Elias, Kuwait Seeks Quick Action on Stimulus, ARAB NEWS, Mar. 25,
2009, available at http://www.arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=120762.
70. See, e.g., WTO won't seek Doha breakthrough this year, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-12wto.18634548.html.
71. See, e.g., Guy Dinmore, G7pledges to avoid protectionism, BBC (LONDON), Feb. 14, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7889222.stm.
72. See, e.g., George Parker, et. al, G20 leaders hail crisis fight back, CAP. DIG. (WASHINGTON
DC), Apr. 2, 2009, available at http:hiwww.capitalistdigesi.com/g-20-leaders-hail-crisis-fightback-
1568.
73.But see , Tim Johnston, Asean split on protectionism, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb 28. 2009,
available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2f3ef95e-050f-I de-8166-000077b07658.html, (discussing that no
real consensus on the balance to be struck between sustaining open markets and promoting
economic activity at home was obtained).
74. See, e.g., Krishna Guha, Difficult promise of co-ordinated response, FIN. TIMES (LONDON),
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and capital flows that are essential to the recovery of the global economy, it
is critical that governments not only harmonize and incorporate"
international standards in their respective domestic laws and policies by
mutual consultation, cooperation and coordination.
B. THE SCOPE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS As 'GAP-FILLERS'
In general, the right of a State to control the entry and operation of
foreign and domestic investments that flows from sovereignty is unlimited.
A State can therefore significantly affect foreign interests subject only to
customary international law, and specific provisions of bilateral, regional or
multilateral treaties assuming both SWF and recipient countries are
contracting parties.
1. The absence of international law norms
There is no customary international law governing the entry and
operation of foreign investments per se given the absence of two essential
components, practice and opinion juris." This lack of a common ground
concerning specific far-reaching standards of foreign investment protection
is underscored by the failure to complete the negotiations relating to the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") which were launched by
the OECD governments in 1995.n Presently, customary international law
only prohibits certain expropriation by host States such as discriminatory
takings or takings without compensation.7 ' Foreign assets and use thereof
may be subject to taxation or trade restrictions. Such measures are not
Nov. 14, 2008. See also Stephen Castle & Dan Bilefsky, E.U. President Calls U.S. Stimulus the 'Way to
Hell', NY TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/europe/26czech.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.(European
countries, including Germany, have resisted calls to increase the scale of their fiscal stimulus arguing,
that the G-20 should concentrate on tightening financial regulation.).
75. See, e.g., Reuven S Avi-Jonah, National Regulation ofimultinational Enterprises -An essay on
comity extraterritoriality and harmonization, 42(1) COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 5 (2003).
76. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw,(Robert Jennings & Aurthur Watts eds., 1992);
Columbian-Peruvian asylum case: Judgment of November 20, 1950, 1950 1.C.J. 267-277, (defines the
meaning of customary international law).
77. See OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investments, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mailintro.htm.[hereinafter "MAI"] The MAI was intended to be a "free
standing international treaty, open to all OECD Members and the European Communities, and to
accession by non-OECD Member Countries" and to "provide a broad multilateral framework to for
international investment with high standards for the liberalisation of investment regimes and investment
protection and with effective dispute settlement procedures." Negotiation ceased in 1998 due to the lack
of consensus among the OECD countries.
78. Takings for a public purpose as provided by law and with compensation are permitted. See
Sornarajah, supra note 60.
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unlawful in the absence of special facts.79 Non-discriminatory measures
relating to anti-trust, consumer protection, environmental protection, land
planning and national security which are essential to the efficient
functioning of the State, are typically non-compensable takings.so
Multilateral treaties such as the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs ("GATT"), General Agreement on Trade and Services ("GATS")
and Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS")" which
relate to trade in goods, services and investment measures involving trade
in goods respectively, do not directly address the issues posed by SWF
investments. For example, unless the recipient country acts in a manner that
adversely affects the trading in goods or services a corporation owned by
an SWF, these multilateral treaties do not protect SWFs or their direct and
portfolio investments from unfair or nationalistic intervention by
governments of recipient countries.
2. The potential application of bilateral agreements
Bilateral agreements such as bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")
and free trade agreements ("FTAs") potentially afford some protection for
SWF investments and can address the fears of recipient countries.
Many bilateral agreements confer the most favored nation status,
national treatment and fair and equitable treatment on foreign
investments.82 Most bilateral agreements adopt an expansive, open-ended
interpretation of the term 'investment', thereby encompassing numerous
types of investment forms and assets. For example, according to the 2004
US Model BIT:
"investment" means every asset that an investor owns or controls,
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment,
including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.
Forms that an investment may take include:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an
enterpnse;
79. IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 509 (6th ed. 2003).
80. See, e.g., Catherine Yannaca-Small, "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right To Regulate" in
International Investment Law 3-5, 16 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., No. 2004/4, 2004),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf.
81. World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/legal-e.htm#agreements. (See the full World Trade
Organization legal texts). .
82. See, e.g., Locknie Hsu, SWFs, Recent US Legislative Changes, and Treaty Obligations, 43(3)
J. WORLD TRADE 451, 458-69 (2009).
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(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession,
revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations,
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable
property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages,
liens, and pledges."
While most if not all bilateral agreements include corporate entities
under the term "investor," the term has varying parameters. Other terms
subject to differing interpretations are the place of incorporation and the
concept of "control," as may be applied to an entity with numerous
investment and management centers and an entity with indirect or informal
means of "control" respectively. Any dispute concerning a SWF
investment is likely to fall within the scope of one or more bilateral
agreements. It has however been argued that the principle of national
treatment may not apply to SWFs. For a violation of such principle, it must
be shown that the discrimination was in a situation where there were "like
circumstances." Clearly, SWFs with its deep pockets and government
associations are not like the other investors.84
Recipient countries are also able to protect their interests in bilateral
agreements. Although most bilateral agreements provide some assurance
against direct and indirect expropriation, there are critical exceptions or
qualifications. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of bilateral agreements
or domestic law, host or recipient countries may carve out restrictions or
limitations falling within "legitimate public welfare objectives" such as
"public health, safety and the environment" from the provisions relating to
"indirect expropriation" of rights in investments. 86  Many bilateral
agreements contain an overriding exception that allows a recipient country
to implement "measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
83. Model BIT Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 1,
2004, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 117601 .pdf [hereinafter "Model BIT"].
For a similar and arguably broader definition, see the German model treaty, available at
http://www.fes-
elobalization.ore/dog publications/Appendix%201%20German%20Model%20Treatv.df.
84. For a more detailed discussion, see M. Sornarajah, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Existing
Structure ofRegulation of Investments (Sovereign Wealth Funds - Governance and Regulation, Asian
Society of International Law, Working Paper, 2009).
85. See, e.g., Small, supra note 80, at 16-21.
86. Model BIT, supra note 83, Annex B, paragraph 4(b); and letter from Robert B. Zoellick,
Deputy Secretary Of State, U.S. Dep't St., to George Yeo, Minister for Trade and Industry, Singapore
(May 6, 2003), available at http://tec.export.gov/static/15-expro.pdf.
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peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.""
Moreover, there are specific exceptions that apply to investments in the
financial services industry. For example, Article 10.10(1) of USSFTA
provides, inter alia, that the recipient or host State can adopt measures for
"prudential reasons" including "the maintenance of the safety, soundness,
integrity or financial responsibility of individual financial institutions or
cross-border financial service suppliers" and "the protection of investors,
depositors, policy holders," or "to ensure the integrity and stability of the
financial system."
Terms such as "national security" in FINSA and "essential security
interests" specified in bilateral agreements, GATT and GTS are subject to
varying interpretations. Questions such as whether the terms are similar,
whether an objective or subjective ("self-judging") test applies, and
whether the terms ought to include fiscal crises beyond military or defense
related threats have been raised. For example, concepts of "public order"
and "essential security interests" embodied in Article XI, the U.S.
Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty" have been subject to a string of
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
rulings endorsing different views and interpretations as to whether the
magnitude of Argentina's financial crisis allowed it to derogate from its
legal obligations to foreign investors.89 In the Continental Casualty v.
Argentina arbitration, the tribunal viewed Article XI and customary
international law defence of necessity as separate defences open to
Argentina, and rejected the earlier approach in Sempra Energy
International v. Argentina Republic90 which construed Article XI
exceptions in accordance with the more stringent tests prescribed under
customary international law. The tribunal ruled that either exception could
encompass situations arising from a severe economic crisis, and endorsed a
"significant margin of appreciation" when it came to applying measures: "a
time of grave crisis is not the time for nice judgments, particularly when
examined by others with the disadvantage of hindsight."1 It however
87. Model BIT, supra note 83, art. 18; and United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, U.S.-Sing., Sept. 3, 2003, 117 Stat. 948. .
88. Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.- Arg., 1991 U.S.T. Lexis 176.
89. For an analysis of Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Dispute decisions relating to Argentina such
as: CMS Case Transmission Co. v. The Argentina Republic, ARB/01/08 (2003), Sempra Energy Int'l v.
The Argentine Republic, ARB/02/16 (2007), Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v The Argentine
Republic, ARB/01/03 (2007), LG&E Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/02/1 (2007) and Cont'l Cas. Co. v The Argentine Republic,
ARB/03/9 (2008), see, e.g., Hsu, supra note 82, at 462-72.
90. Sempra Energy Int'l v. The Argentine Republic, (U.S. v. Arg.), Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv.
Dispute, ARB/02/16 at 36-44 (2007).
91. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. The Argentine Republic, (U.S. v. Arg.), Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv.
Dispute, ARB/03/09 at 80 (2008).
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rejected Argentina's argument that Article XI should be viewed as "self-
judging" by the state.92
Regulators in recipient countries are also likely to require SWFs to
undertake not to acquire rights of control or management, or any role in
governance, in the relevant corporations, contrary to allegations that there
is "little accountability to regulators."" Specific undertakings relating to
the suspension of voting or participation rights may be required under the
recipient countries' securities laws or laws governing foreign investments.94
Furthermore, regulators sometimes deviate from corporate standards
of control stipulated in current laws and regulations by pursuing a more
malleable concept whereby they exercise jurisdiction to review and take
action in transactions where the foreign investor acquires less than a
majority of the domestic corporation's voting securities. For example, the
CFIUS reviewed the proposed acquisition of 3Com Corporation by Bain
Capital Investors, LLC, a private equity fund, and Huawei Technologies
Co., a Chinese company known for its strong ties with the government of
China." The 'national security' concern stemmed from 3com's defense
technology and TippingPoint, a security software firm, used by the U.S.
The parties abandoned the deal because they failed to reach a "mitigation"
agreement typically involving safeguards and pledges with CFIUS.96 SWFs
are likely to encounter similar treatment. Faced with the prospect of a
lengthy or unpredictable review, SWFs are likely to withdraw from their
investment plans. The delay and undue publicity places SWFs at a
disadvantage compared to other institutional buyers such as hedge funds
and insurance companies.
It may be possible to challenge the legality of CFIUS' review of
SWF, assuming the SWF and recipient country are contracting parties to an
agreement similar to the US Model BIT." Articles 11(4) and 11(5) of the
92. U.S. v. Arg., ARB/03/09 at 86-88.
93. Leaders: The Invasion of the Sovereign- Wealth Funds; Capital Markets, THE ECONOMIST, Jan.
19, 2008, at 11.
94. For example, Singapore SWF, Temasek Holdings', which invested in Merrill Lynch, had no
rights of control. See Press Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc, Merrill Lynch Enhances Its Capital
Position by Raising Up to $6.2 Billion From Investors, Temasek Holdings and Davis Selected Advisors
(Dec. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695-7696_8149_74412_86378_87784; and Select Investment
Terms on Temasek Holdings, Merrill Lynch & Co., (Dec. 28, 2007) available at
http://www.ml.com/media/92240.pdf.
95. Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Security Concerns Block China's 3Com Deal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
2008 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21invest.html.
96. Press Release, 3Com, 3Com and Bain Capital Partners Announce Mutual Withdrawal of
CFIUS Application, (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.3com.com/corpinfo/enUS/pressbox/press-release.jsp?INFOID=283097.
97. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 17601.pdf.
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US Model BIT stipulate that each party shall ensure that its administrative
proceedings are carried out in a "consistent, impartial and reasonable
manner," and "shall establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review
and, where warranted, correction of final administrative actions". It has
been observed that draconian powers such as the retrospective review of
existing transactions," the exemption from public disclosure of information
filed with the President or his designee,99 the exclusion of judicial review of
the President's actions and findings,' 0 exercisable pursuant to FINSA,
contravene provisions in bilateral agreements similar to the aforementioned
Articles 11(4) and 11(5).'0 Nevertheless, if one accepts that concepts of
"national security" and "essential security interests" encompass economic
crises albeit some controversy concerning the severity of the crisis, the
overriding carve-outs in bilateral agreements, GATT and GTS would
whitewash a review or action implemented pursuant to FINSA.
C. THE DOMESTIC SWF RULE OF LAW
In general, SWFs as government entities, are subject to wealth
management benchmarks'02 and the corporate rule of law-procedural
norms of accountability, transparency and disclosure. These are enforced
pursuant to a mix of public and private laws and practices in their home
countries.' These procedural norms are broadly consistent with the
Santiago Principles, particularly, the following:
GAPP 4. Principle: There should be clear and publicly
disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in relation
to the SWF's general approach to funding, withdrawal, and
spending operations.
GAPP 4.1 Sub-principle The source of SWF funding should be
publicly disclosed.
98. Defense Production Act of 1950, § 721(a)(3), 50 U.S.C. App. 2170 (2007) ("'covered
transaction' means any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or pending after August 23,
1988, by or with any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.").
99.Id. at § 721(c).-
=Confidentiality of information.-Any information or documentary material filed with the
President or the President's designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and no such information or
documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any
administrative or judicial action or proceeding.
100. Id. at § 721(e).
101. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 82, at 469-72.
102. For an overview of the challenges of managing sovereign wealth, see generally, TODD
GROOME, SOVEREIGN WEALTH MANAGEMENT (JENNIFER JOHNSON-CALARI AND MALAN RIETVELD
eds., 2007).
103. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Wealth Turn, (Rutgers School of Law-Newark Research
Papers No. 025, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 272395.
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GAPP 4.2 Sub-principle The general approach to withdrawals
from the SWF and spending on behalf of the government
should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 10. Principle: The accountability framework for the
SWF's operations should be clearly defined in the relevant
legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or
management agreement.
GAPP 11. Principle: An annual report and accompanying
financial statements on the SWF's operations and performance
should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with
recognized international or national accounting standards in a
consistent manner.
GAPP 12. Principle: The SWF's operations and financial
statements should be audited annually in accordance with
recognized international or national auditing standards in a
consistent manner.
GAPP 15. Principle: SWF operations and activities in host
countries should be conducted in compliance with all applicable
regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which
they operate.
GAPP 18. Principle: The SWF's investment policy should be
clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk tolerance,
and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing
body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio management
principles.
GAPP 18.1 Sub-principle: The investment policy should guide
the SWF's financial risk exposures and the possible use of
leverage.
GAPP 18.2 Sub-principle: The investment policy should
address the extent to which internal and/or external investment
managers are used, the range of their activities and authority,
and the process by which they are selected and their
performance monitored.
GAPP 18.3 Sub-principle: A description of the investment
policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed.
GAPP 19. Principle: The SWF's investment decisions should
aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner
consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic
and financial grounds.
GAPP 19.1 Sub-principle: If investment decisions are subject to
other than economic and financial considerations, these should
be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly
disclosed.
GAPP 19.2 Sub-principle: The management of an SWF's assets
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should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound
asset management principles.'04
It has been observed that SWFs with the active involvement of
political leaders are more sensitive to the social needs of the nation, and
consequently are more willing to accept investments which have high
social returns but low private returns.'0o The application of the rule of law
however varies for each SWF, regardless of the nature of its constitution-
whether as a publicly constituted arm of the government at one end or a
private corporate entity wholly or substantially owned by the government.
For example, the SWFs of Norway and Saudi Arabia, the Government
Pension Fund and SAMA Foreign Holdings respectively, are funds
established by the respective Ministries of Finance. However, their
governing corporate rule of law significantly differs, pursuant to divergent
public laws and political structure of each government. As shown in Figure
2 below, in contrast to Norway's Government Pension Fund, SAMA
Foreign Holdings' ranking on various research sources' scale of
accountability, independence and transparency remains low
notwithstanding its role as a permanent observer to the IWG concerning the
Santiago Principles.
Figure 2: the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index (3Q 2009)"'
Country - SWF Ranking Country - SWF Ranking
Chile - 10 Qatar - QIA 5
UAE - Mubadala 10 China -NCSSF 5
Singapore - Temasek 10 Malaysia - lMDB 5
Ireland - NPRF 10 Saudi Arabia - 4
SAMA
Azerbaijan 10 Saudi Arabia - PIF 4
USA - Alaska 10 Vietnam 4
Norway - GPF 10 UAE -lCD 4
New Zealand 10 China - CAD 4
USA - Wyoming 9 Botswana 3
USA - New Mexico 9 UAE - IPIC 3
South Korea - KIC 9 UAE - ADIA - 3
Canada AHF 9 UAE - ELA 2
Australian Future Fund 9 Libya - LIA 2
Bahrain 8 China - SAFE 2
Hong Kong - HKMA 8 Venezuela - FIEM 1
104. Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) - Santiago Principles, International
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm.
105. See S. Bernstein eta!., The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14861, 2009).
106. Carl Linaburg & Michael Maduell, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, The Linaburg-Maduell
Transparency Index (3rd Quarter 2009) available at
http://swfinstitute.orgresearch/transparencyindex.php.
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China - CIC 7 Oman 1
Kazakhstan 6 Nigeria 1
Timor-Leste 6 Mauritania 1
Singapore - GIC 6 Kiribati 1
Kuwait - KIA 6 Iran 1
Malaysia 5 Brunei 1
Trinidad & Tobago 5 Algeria 1
Russia 5
Point Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index
Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of
wealth, and government ownership structure
+1 Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports
+ 1 Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and
geographic locations of holdings
+1 Fund provides total portfolio market value, returns, and
management compensation
+1 Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards,investment policies, and enforcer of guidelines
+1 Fund provides clear strategies and objectives
+1 If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contactinformation
+1 If applicable, the fund identifies external managers
+1 Fund manages its own web site
+1 Fund provides main office location address and contact information
such as telephone and fax
Several examples of SWFs constituted under private laws but owned
by governments or their public arms, are China's China Investment
Corporation ("CIC")'0  and SAFE Investment Company ("SAFE")0 ,
Singapore's The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd
("GIC")'09 and Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd ("Temasek"),"o and United Arab
107. China Investment Corporation (CIC) is an investment institution established as a wholly state-
owned company under the Company Law of the People's Republic of China, http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen/about cic/aboutcicoverview.html (last visited Oct. I1, 2009).
108. The SAFE Investment Company is organized as a privately held firm. Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute - SAFE Investment Company, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/safe.php. See also The SAFE
Investment Company, http://www.safe.gov.cn (last visited Oct. I1, 2009).
109. GIC was incorporated under the Companies Act (Cap. 50) of Singapore in 1981. It is wholly
owned by the Government of Singapore and manages the foreign reserves of Singapore,
http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
I 10.Temasek was incorporated under the Companies Act (Cap. 50) of Singapore in 1974. It is
wholly owned by the Government of Singapore and acts as an investment house for the Ministry
of Finance. Temasek Holdings Information Factsheet, available at
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Emirates' SWFs, Abu Dhabi Investment Company ("ADIC")"', Dubai
International Capital LLC' 12, and Mubadala Development Company
("Mubadala").1 3 Most of the directors of all such SWFs hold concurrent
positions in the executive branch of government and other publicly owned
corporations. SWFs such as CIC"4 and GIC"' have independent advisory
bodies. The degree of accountability and transparency of the government of
each SWF country generally corresponds with the degree of involvement of
external managers and committees, and foreign board directors or senior
management officers.
In addition to the "bottom-lines", such as income and capital gains
benchmarks, certain SWFs are required by their respective domestic laws
and internal regulations to ensure their investments comply with
environmental and human rights laws. For example, Norway's SWF,
Government Pension Fund-Global must ensure that its investments comply
with ethical guidelines which embody substantive norms that are enacted
and enforced under Norway's laws, but are contentious in foreign
jurisdictions."' The business activities, operations and management of
investee corporations are closely monitored by a council of ethics. Any
breach of the ethical guidelines is likely to result in a divestment."'
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centre-information-factsheet.htm (last visited Oct.
11, 2009).
111. Founded in 1977, ADIC is a joint stock company that is jointly owned by the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority and the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and specializes in providing investment and
corporate finance in addition to advisory services: InvestAD, available at
http://www.investad.ae/en/AboutUs/About.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
112. Dubai International Capital LLC is a Dubai-based international investment company with a
primary focus on private and public equity. It was established in 2004 as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Dubai Holding with the mandate to build an international portfolio of diverse business assets. Dubai
International Capital, LLC, available at http://www.dubaiic.com/en/company/about-dic.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009).
113. Mubadala is a Public Joint Stock Company established in 2002, wholly owned by the
Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Its focus is on developing and managing an extensive and
economically diverse portfolio of commercial initiatives: Mudabalam http://www.mubadala.com/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2009).
114. International Advisory Council, http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen/govemance/management_intemational.html (last visited Oct. I1, 2009).
115. See GIC Investment Committee, http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutusmgtteam-comm.htm; GIC
Risk Committee, http://www.gic.com.sg/aboutus-mgtteam-riskcomm.htm. (last visited Oct. I1, 2009).
116. SeeNBIM, http://www.nbim.no/templates/article 41206.aspx (last visited Oct 25, 2009)
for Norway's SWF's approach concerning "socially responsible investments". See also Norway's
SWF's ethical guidelines and the role of its Advisory Council of on Ethics at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Govemment/ministry-of-
finance/234231/234285/the-govemment-petroleumfund-ethical.html?id=253669 (last visited Oct. 11,
2009). For a detailed discussion on ethical divestment of NBIM, see, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The
Turn to Ethics: Divestment from Multinational Corporations for Human Rights violations - The Case of
Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 577 (2008).
117. See, e.g., Terry Macalister, Ethical business: Norway ejects mining giant Rio from its pension
portfolio, GUARDIAN, Sep. 9, 2008, available at
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D. A NEW APPROACH: DELIBERATIVE FORA AND GOOD PRACTICES
1. The decline of a central regulator and the rise of the deliberative fora
Given the fluidity of the financial markets and diverse interests, it
would not be feasible for the oversight of a regime of international
governance for SWFs and their investments to be entrusted to any
particular international or regional institution or group. Regional bodies
represent the interests of their members and may be weighted in favor of
some countries. For example, most of the 30 members of OECD'1 are
'Western' countries who are the recipients of SWF investments.
International organizations such as the IMF have structural flaws such as
unequal quotas and voices in favour of countries with large economies.119
This is likely to change in light of the increasing shift of economic power
to non-Western countries such as China and India,'20 and the broad
consensus obtained at the G20 London summit of 2009 to implement the
package of the IMF quota and voice reforms by 201 1.121
In recent months, global fora such as the G20 meetings have been
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/09/riotinto.ethicalbusiness; Mark Lander, Norway Keeps
Nest Egg From Some U.S. Companies, NY TIMES, May 4,2007, at Cl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.html?-r=1&scp=3&sq=no
rway&st=nyt Norway added Wal-Mart Stores to its blacklist, alleging that the retailer was guilty of
tolerating child-labor violations by its suppliers in the developing world and obstructing unions at
home. The fund sold off more than $400 million worth of Wal-Mart shares.Press Release, Norway
Ministry of Finance, Two companies - Wal-Mart and Freeport - are being excluded from the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund - Global's investment universe (Jun. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/Press-releases/2006/Two-companies-Wal-Mart-
and-Freeport-.html?id=104396; and Press Release, Norway Ministry of Finance, Advisory
Commission, Question of whether investments in Singapore Technologies Engineering can imply a
violation of Norway's international obligations (Mar. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/ethical-guidelines-
for-the-government-pe/Advisory-Commission-Documents/Advisory-Commission.html?id-413581.
See also Norway's Government Pension Fund Manager, NBIM, Investor Expectations on Children's
Rights, Nov. 2008,available at http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article 73703.aspx (last
visited Oct. 12, 2009).
118. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. (last visited Oct. 12,
2009).
119. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall, WHY IT MATTERS WHO RUNS THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK, IN
GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION STATE: THE IMPACT OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK (Gustav
Ranis, James Raymond Vreeland & Stephen Kosack, eds., 2006).
120. Henry Sanderson, China wants more say in globalfinancial bodies, INT'L BUS. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20081029/china-wants-more-say-global-financial-
bodies.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
121. G20 Communiqu6 from the London Summit, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (Apr.
2, 2009) para. 20 at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
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utilized as platforms to forge common values for both "old" and "new"
economic powers. 2 2 It is noteworthy that G20 and not the 'old' economic
powers such as G7 ("Western" powers with Japan) or G8 (G7 plus Russia)
is being used as a forum to redress the current economic problems.123 The
global financial and trade frameworks are clearly evolving with the rise of
new economic powers-Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) 24 , and the
reversal of capital flow and economic power primarily from the geo-
political "West" to the "East." 25
2. An alternative approach: SWF Principles as the 'good practices'
catalyst
An alternative approach has been pursued through the establishment
of "soft" codes and "good practices" such as the Santiago Principles and
OECD Declaration on Recipient Country Policies (collectively, the SWF
Principles). This approach takes into account existing foreign investment
laws and practices which already ensures the avoidance of the worst case
scenarios concerning rogue SWFs. It leverages on existing bilateral
investment agreements and cooperative platforms such as the G20, and
bilateral and regional structures such as the U.S. Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements which provide strategic frameworks and principles
for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United States and
122. The G20 gathers the seven major industrialized countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy,
Japan, Germany and the United States) and Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the European Union. See G-20,
http://www.g20.org/. (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). See also Chua Chin Hon, G-20 replaces G-8 as main
economic forum, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Sep. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/World/Story/STIStory434623.html.
123. Quentin Peel, A wider order comes into view, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93eOfc7c-2242- Ilde-8380-00144feabdcO.html?nclickcheck=I (last visited
Oct. 12, 2009). (Apr. 5, 2009).
124. An acronym first coined by Jim O'Neill in Building Better Global Economic BRICs (Goldman
Sachs: Global Economics Paper 66, 2001). The BRIC first summit was held in June 2009: see, e.g.,
Isabel Gorst, Medvedev urges fairer global order, 'FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jun. 16, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0fdc961c-5a9a-1 1de-8c 14-
00144feabdcO.html?catid=20&SID=29da8f3197845b7490e7b2cb2/b94cb2.
125.For an observation of the reversal of capital flows and political rhetoric, see,e.g., Yvonne
CL Lee, Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: The Pitfalls and Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
GEO. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming, 2009). See generally, Jack Bormann, Consultant & Advisor to
IMF Management, Address at the High level round table in Rome addressing Sixty Years After
Bretton Woods: Developing a Vision for the Future, IMF needs to rethink "the voice and vote" of
its members (Jul. 23, 2004), available at http://www.imf org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2004/080904.pdf
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, THE IMF AND THE G-20 - A GREAT
TRANSFORMATION IN THE MAKING? (World Economic Forum, The Reinventing Bretton
Woods Committee) (Richard Samans, Marc Uzan and Augusto Lopez-Claros, eds
2007)(volume contains contributions from Michael Buchanan, The BRIC Dream: An Update,
Gordon de Brouwer, Institutions to Promote Financial Stability: Reflections on East Asia and an
Asian Monetary Fund).
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the other parties such as ASEAN and certain SWF countries, Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.12 6
Notwithstanding the remarkable speed at which the SWF Principles
was formulated, they may however be criticized on several grounds. First,
since they are not legally binding, they are not "hard" law as commonly
understood. This criticism is however premised upon a particular Austinian
conception of international law and its functions, and unjustifiably
discounts the growing influence of "non-law" on the laws, policies and
practices of States. It discounts the commercial feasibility in adhering to
such "non-law" given the benefits and risks for both SWF and recipient
countnes.
Second, the SWF Principles suffer from vague concepts. In relation to
the Santiago Principles, some examples are "sound" and "effective
operation" (GAPP 1), "best interests of the SWFs" (GAPP 8), option to
choose from either "recognized international or national auditing
standards" (GAPP 12), "relevant financial information regarding the SWF
should be publicly disclosed" (GAPP 17) and broad carve-outs such that
each principle is "subject to home country laws, regulations, requirements
and obligations,"l27 an equivocal commitment to "explore the establishment
of a standing group" for the facilitation of the understanding and
implementation of the principles,128 and an absence of a central regulator
and enforcer.
Furthermore, many of such vague concepts are controversial. For
example, the OECD Declaration on Recipient Country Policies contain
contested concepts such as "protectionist", "discriminate" and "legitimate
national security concerns" are: Recipient countries "should not erect
protectionist barriers to foreign investment" and "discriminate among
investors in like circumstances," "additional investment restrictions in
recipient countries should only be considered when policies of general
application to both foreign and domestic investors are inadequate to
address legitimate national security concerns," and where "such national
security concerns do arise, investment safeguards by recipient countries
should be transparent and predictable, proportional to clearly-identified
national security risks, and subject to accountability in their application."
Notwithstanding the SWF Principles' non-binding nature and elusive
concepts, its potential for SWF and recipient countries to reach a common
understanding and practice should not be under-estimated. A new "thin"
SWF rule of law has emerged and is evolving. SWF and recipient countries
126. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements. (last visited Oct. I1, 2009).
127. Santiago Principles, supra note 1, at 7.
128. Id. at 6.
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appear to be ad idem concerning several broad principles and common
values such as fiscal norms of propriety, profits and prudence, corporate
governance processes boosting accountability and transparency and
macroeconomic objectives of growth and development and financial
stability. Specific shared elements between the two "interest" groups may
be observed in the recently issued the SWF Principles. Both groups
acknowledge the adverse implications of rising protectionism and maintain
their support for market liberalization, specifically, the freedom of
investment and benefits of free flows of capital. They advocate an
adherence to the principles of accountability, independence and
transparency; protectionism and agree that rogue investment strategies
should be distinguished from real national security concerns and fair
commercial competition.
The SWF Principles, as a product of comity and cooperation between
SWF and recipient countries, can form the integrative premise for specific
agreements and arrangement in future.129 The IWG, by not labeling its
Santiago Principles as a "code" or "soft" law, avoids the dichotomy
between "hard" and "soft" law that "marginalizes strategies not framed in
the soft v. hard law language".130 The use of a "code" as "soft" law for
example, suggests an acceptance by parties that such code may "harden"
into binding law. This shifts the starting point of discussion from a focus on
identifying and working towards common interests and objectives, to a
need to manage the prospect of specific norms being legally binding and
potentially prejudicial in the future. Consequently, countries may be
constrained from engaging in constructive debate to consider and examine
the effectiveness of strategies towards achieving a specified goal.
The SWF Principles should therefore be assessed on their own merits
without the "garnish and frills of softness." Countries are then free to adopt
specific aspects of "good practices" and "harden" relevant national laws,
policies and practices. "Good practices" may be likened to a financial form
of lex mercatoria which is an "organic" set of self-creating and self-
enforceable norms, that can be "adopted" by international or domestic law
and practice."'
Specifically, States may pursue their respective policy goals by
entering into bilateral or regional arrangements that establish normative
standards in line with the SWF Principles that incorporate access to
arbitration venues such as ICSID without restraining their freedom to
129. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence ofNonbinding International Agreements, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 304 (1977).
130. Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies ofSoft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 554 (2006).
131. See Robilant, supra note 130, at 519-520,544; and Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, The Empirical
and Theoretical Underpinnings ofthe Law Merchant: Lex Mercatoria-Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5
CHI. J. INT'L L. 67 (2004).
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modify their laws or practices in pursuit of their national interests. Several
examples of provisions that apply to SWF investments are: First, the
relevant SWF country and its SWF covenant not to hold any position of
control or management in specified "sensitive" industries without the prior
approval of the recipient country. Second, SWF and recipient countries
agree to negotiate a mutually acceptable set of disclosure and transparency
rules concerning the SWF's strategy and management in relation to the
relevant investment. Third, the meaning of "national security" or "essential
security interests" includes severe financial crises, particularly defined as,
for example, a continued and drastic contraction of the economy over
several financial quarters.
Indeed, the broad framework of the SWF Principles has facilitated
overall discourse, participation and creation of "good principles, policies
and practices" amongst recipient and home countries, and existing
international and regional financial institutions and bodies. Within six
months of the Santiago Principles' publication, the IWG established the
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds.'32 Although the forum is
stipulated not to be a "formal supranational authority" and "its work shall
not carry any legal force", it facilitates the continued exchange of views
and study of SWF activities among the SWF and recipient countries,
international organizations and market functionaries. The forum serves as
a foundational step towards the synchronization of differing domestic laws
and practices and the eventual adoption of uniform norms for SWF
investments by each State.
The effectiveness of SWF Principles in relation to certain "non-
Western" SWFs is already evident. For example, shortly after the IWG was
formed to create the Santiago Principles, the Singapore SWF, GIC issued a
report on its investment strategies and policies.133 Although the GIC report
has not attained the same standards of accountability, disclosure and
transparency as those relating to Western SWFs such as Norway, further
changes are likely.134 The other Singapore SWF, Temasek recently adopted
a more transparent stance as evident from its press releases.'33  Together
with a few other SWFs, Temasek has ranked first on The Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index since its 4th quarter 2008 ratings (Figure 2 -
3rd quarter 2009), compared to its tenth position out of 47 SWFs in the
132. Int'l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds,The "Kuwait Declaration": Establishment of
the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, (Apr. 6, 2009) available at http://www.iwg-
swf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm.
133. GIC, Report on the Management of the Government's Portfolio For the Year 2007/08, (2008),
available at http://www.gic.com.sg/PDF/GlCreport0708-Full.pdf.
134. Lim, supra note 37.
135. Temasek Holdings, http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/mediacentre.htm. (last visited Oct.
11,2009).
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second quarter of 2008.136 In more recent developments, Mubadala, an
Abu Dhabi SWF, released its annual report showing losses of Dhl 1.8
billion (US$3.2 billion),"' in a "first of its kind move" towards greater
transparency by a Gulf state investment entity,' and China Investment
Corporation published its first annual report in August 2009 which
registered a net profit of US$23.1 billion in 2008.139
IV. SINGAPORE SWFS'4 0 AS AN OPTIMAL MODEL
Instead of a global investment architecture with a central regulator,
Singapore's SWFs have adopted an incremental and contextualised
approach. The practice of Singapore's SWFs reveals a pragmatic balance
between politics and principles at three different levels. As discussed in
earlier sections, on a global level, Singapore's SWFs have responded to the
recipients' concerns and participated in the issuance of the Santiago
Principles. Their bilateral arrangements and agreements are likely to take
into account the specific concerns raised by recipient countries. For
example, although SWF investments are not specifically mentioned in the
US - Singapore Free Trade Agreement ("USSFTA"),14' the similarly
worded definitions of "investment"' 42 and "investor"l4 are broad enough to
136. Sovereign Wealth Fund, Inc., http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/2q2008transparency.php.
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
137. Mubadala, 2008 Mubadala Annual Report, (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.mubadala.ae/en/category/investor-relations- 12/annual-report-I/. (last visited Oct. 11,
2009).
138. Andrew England, Gulffund reveals $3.2bn loss as it releases first report, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Apr. 24, 2009, at 26.
139. China Investment Corporation (CIC), 2008 CIC Annual Report, (Jul. 22, 2009), available at w
http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/resources/resourcesnewsl0.html. (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
140. This article treats Temasek as an SWF on the basis of its government shareholding and
investment strategy. See S. Dhanabalan, Chairman of Temasek, Role ofSovereign Funds in Today's
Globalization, Speech at The Indus Entrepreneurs Event (Aug. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centre-news-speeches_210808.htm. See also Temasek says
it is not a sovereign wealth funds, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Mar. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_219340.html.(Temasek said that it is not affected by
an agreement by Singapore, Abu Dhabi and the United States on principles to increase the transparency
of sovereign wealth funds. 'Temasek is not a sovereign wealth fund' its spokesman Mark Lee said in a
telephone interview. Temasek has to "sell assets to raise cash for new investments and doesn't require
the government to give approvals". Nevertheless, in spite of Temasek's perception of itself as an
"atypical" SWF which does not receive new funds or directions from its shareholder, Temasek has
made significant attempts to support the Santiago Principles.).
141. Office of the United States Trade Representative, US - Singapore Free Trade Agreement
USSFTA), (last updated April 20, 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/singapore-fta/final-text. [hereinafter USSFTA].
142. USSFTA, Id. at 155. (Article 15.1:
"investment means every asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor,
that has the characteristics of an investment. Forms that an investment may take include:
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encompass their direct and portfolio investments. On a domestic level,
Singapore's SWFs are subject to two different regimes-the securities,
investment and national security laws of the recipient countries and the
constitutional and company laws of Singapore. The pragmatic practice of
Singapore's SWFs serves as a viable starting point for achieving an optimal
balance between nationalism and global financial stability based on free
capital and investment flows. The following sections set out the
characteristics of Singapore's SWFs and the governing public law and
private law regimes that address the articulated fears of recipient countries
to a large extent.'"
A. GIC AND TEMASEK AS SINGAPORE'S SWFs
GIC and Temasek are, respectively, the investment management and
holding arms of the Singapore Government.145 They are private companies
incorporated under Singapore's Companies Act (Cap. 50)146 in 1981 and
1974 respectively, and are wholly owned by the Singapore Government.
While GIC does not own assets and only manages assets and foreign
reserves on behalf of the Singapore Government, Temasek owns and
manages its own investments and assets after initial seeding in 1974 and
transfers of some assets from the Government in 1990s.147
Officially, as of Mar. 31, 2009,148 GIC managed wealth of over
(a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; (d) futures, options, and other
derivatives . . ."
143. Id. at 207. (Article 17:
"investor of a Party means a Party or national or an enterprise of a Party that is seeking to
make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; provided,
however that a natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a
national of the State of his/her dominant and effective nationality . . .").
144. See, e.g., Kala Anandarajah, Corporate Governance Reforms in Singapore-Economic
Realities, Political Institutions, and Regulatory Frameworks, REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA- ECONOMICs, POLITICS AND REGULATIONS, (ISEAS Publications 2005) at 266.
(detailed discussion on the role of Singapore Government and the independence of the companies
linked or owned by it [similar to the concept of 'state owned enterprises' in North America]).; Yvonne
C.L. Lee, The Corporate Rule of Law: Singapore's Securities Regulators, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L.
REv. 225 (2007); Joseph Y.S. Lim, Ruth S.K. Tan & S.Y. Ow, ANALYSTS' PERCEPTION AND
PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT LINKED COMPANIES (2008); Andrea Goldstein & Pavida Pananond,
Singapore Inc. Goes Shopping Abroad: Profits and Pitfalls, 38 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 417 (2008).
145. See generally, GIC and Temasek websites at http://www.gic.com.sg and
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg, respectively; see also Santiago Principles, supra note 1, at 44-47.
146. COMPANIES ACT, Singapore (Cap. 50 Rev. Ed. 2006).
147. See generally, GIC and Temasek websites at http://www.gic.com.sg and
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg, respectively.
148. See GIC,GIC's second annual report, available at
http://www.gic.com.sg/PDF/GICReport 2009.pdf, and Temasek's Review 2009 available at
http://review.temasek.com.sg/institution(last visited Oct. 11, 2009). The respective fund values have
significantly depreciated since Mar. 31, 2008. See, e.g., Lim Hwee Hua, Temasek, GIC Losses Won't
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US$100 billionl4 9 with an average annual rate of return of 2.6% above
inflation in real terms, and Temasek owned a net portfolio value that grew
from an initial S$354 million transferred from the Singapore Government
to S$185 billion (US$134 billion) in the previous financial year, and has
since dropped to S$130 billion or US$86 billion"o with a total shareholder
return by market value and shareholder funds of over 16%. Their
geographical distribution of asset portfolios comprises:
GIC"' Temasekm
45% (Americas: U.S. (34%) 22% (OECD Economies excluding
29% (Europe) Korea)
24% (Asia) 31% (Singapore)
27% (North Asia : China,
Taiwan, Korea)
9% (ASEAN excluding
Singapore),
7% (South Asia: India, Pakistan)
2% (Australasia) 4% (Latin America and others)
B. PRIVATE LAW OVERSIGHT
The activities and holdings of GIC and Temasek are transparent to
some extent under private laws. GIC, as an exempt private company and
manager, is not required by law to disclose information about its clients'
assets and reserves. Assets owned by its group of subsidiaries are not
subject to statutory disclosures because these subsidiaries are also exempt
private companies." However, the heightened scrutiny of its SWF
activities has increased pressure on GIC to be more transparent. It has
issued two annual reports to clarify its investment processes, long-term
performance and strategies, albeit without details as to assets, income and
Drain Reserves, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Feb. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.sgpolitics.net/?p=2248. (where Senior Minister of State for Finance Lim Hwee Hua assured
parliamentarians that Singapore's reserves would not be depleted by the losses of Temasek and GIC).
149. Edwin M. Truman, A Scoreboard for Sovereign Wealth Funds, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (2007), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/trumanl007swf.pdf.
150. Temasek's portfolio is currently estimated at a reduced US$85 billion. Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE, Oct. 7, 2009,
available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php.
151. GIC, Second Annual Report, supra note 148.
152. Temasek Review 2009, supra note 148.
153. See COMPANY ACT, COMPANIES (EXEMPT PRIVATE COMPANIES) (CONSOLIDATION)
NOTIFICATION (Cap. 50), Singapore,(2002), available at
http://www.acra.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/A58DF64E-8 1CC-4060-90FF-
6F2 1000A0055/9642/CompaniesExemptPrivateCompaniesConsolidationNotifi.pdf.
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liabilities.'54 Temasek, as an exempt private company, is also not legally
obligated to make statutory disclosures of its accounts. It has however
voluntarily issued the annual Temasek Review since 2004, which provides
an overview of investment strategy and governance framework, in addition
to group financials and investment details."' While observers applaud the
release of Temasek Review, its shortcomings have been noted. 15 6
Furthermore, although GIC and Temasek are owned by the Singapore
Government, their respective boards of directors are formally separate and
independent from one another. Each is managed by independent
professional officers. This independence has been reiterated by the
Singapore Government and the two SWFs.'" However, while some
Temasek directors are associated with private companies such as
ExxonMobil Asia Pacific, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken ("SEB"), SAAB
AB and AB Electrolux and L M Ericsson, most GIC directors have
portfolios as ministers or are associated with government owned
companies."' Furthermore, there are familial connections between the GIC
and Temasek boards, and the Singapore Government. For example, the
chairman of GIC is Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, who was the former
Prime Minister of Singapore. His son, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long is a
GIC director and was concurrently a Minister for Finance from 2001 to
2007.159 Prime Minister Lee's wife, Ho Ching, is the current CEO and
154. GIC, Second Annual Report, supra note 148.
155. Temasek Review 2009, supra note 148.
156. The Temasek Review 2008 was audited using the standard of SSA 800, available at
www.accountants.org.sg/articles/1 922/.. ./SSA%20800%20(clean).doc. Generally, the Temasek
Reviews do not stipulate specific key accounting policies, pay and incentive schemes, and paint only a
"broad-brush" picture of its balance sheet, income statement and cash flow. In response, Temasek has
provided some clarification. See Temasek Holdings,
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/pdf/TR2007%20FAQs.pdf. (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
157. See, e.g., Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Minister of Finance, INVESTMENTS BY GICAND
TEMASEK HOLDINGS IN UBSAND MERRILL LYNCH, 84 PARL. DEB., SG.,(1 Ith Ser.) (2009) 10,
available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/getjhighlighted-content jsp?doclD=33072&hlLevel=Terms&lin
ks=&hlWords=
&hlTitle=&queryOption=l &ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/2008012
1/20080121_S0006_T0009.html#l; Eunice Elizabeth Olsen, Nominated Member, and Lim Hwee Hua,
Second Minister for Finance, Budget, 82 PARL. DEB., SG.,(l Ith Ser.) (2007) 2303, available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/get-highlighted-content.jsp?doclD=6238&hlLevel=Terms&link
s=&hlWords=
&hlTitle=&queryOption=1&ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/2007030
2/20070302.50003T0003.html#l. (where the Government emphasized that it neither influences nor
second-guesses any Temasek's investment decisions, and Temasek is accountable to it as shareholder
for delivering a good rate of return on its overall investment portfolio, and not any investment in
isolation; and statements of Temasek and GIC at their respective websites.).
158. See Temasek, Temasek Board of Directors: About Us,
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/aboutusboard of directors.htm.
159. Singapore, The Cabinet, Cabinet Appointments: Lee Hsien Loong,
http://www.cabinet.gov.sg/CabinetAppointments/Mr%2BLee%2BHsien%2BLoong.htm (last visited
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director of Temasek.160
As mentioned in the earlier section, the SWF Principles have
positively influenced Singapore SWFs' governance behaviour as evidenced
by GIC's issuance of its first and second annual reports and Temasek's top
ranking on The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.' 6 ' Temasek has
recently revised its charter to reaffirm its role as "an active investor and
value-adding shareholder to deliver sustainable long-term value". Its
charter, first published in 2002, now emphasizes that Temasek would
"work its portfolio companies to ensure financial discipline and sound
governance in building significant international or regional businesses." 62
C. PUBLIC LAW OVERSIGHT
A fair degree of public accountability in the form of presidential and
parliamentary oversights exists under current law. Both come under the
purview of the elected President of Singapore in two key areas: The
appointment and/or removal of members of the Board of Directors
require(s) the assent of the President; the financial statements and proposed
budgets must be submitted to the President for his approval. The President
is constitutionally entitled to information concerning GIC and Temasek in
the aforesaid key areas. However, the President is not involved in the daily
monitoring and supervision of their activities. These powers are
reactionary, in that the President does not initiate his own fiscal policies
and proposals, and exercises these powers only when the government needs
Oct. 25, 2009).
160. It was recently announced that Ho Ching would be stepping down as CEO to allow for her
successor, an American, Charles W. Goodyear who was the former CEO of BHP Billiton. Temasek's
chairman, S Danabalan cited the availability of the highly qualified successor as the reason for the
change, and dismissed rumours that losses incurred by Temasek were the reasons for Ho Ching's
departure. See, e.g., Press Release, Temasek Holdings, Temasek Holdings Appoints Charles W.
Goodyear as Member of the Board and CEO-Designate (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://ww.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centrenewsreleases-060209.htm. However, in a
surprising turn of events, Temasek Holdings announced that Goodyear would not take over as chief
executive of the Singapore state investment company as planned, following strategic "differences." See
John Burton, Temasek says Goodyear will not be chief, THE FIN. TIMES (LONDON),Jul. 21, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/6fc55de6-75db- I 1de-84c7-
001 44feabdcO,Authorised=false.html?_i-location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2FO
%2F6fc55de6-75db-I lde-84c7-
00144feabdcO.html%3Fftcamp%3Drss&_i-referer-http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2Fsearch%3Fq
%3DTemasek%2520says%2520Goodyear/o2520will%2520not%2520be%2520chief/o26form%3DSO
LTLB&ftcamp=rss.
161. Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index,
http://www.swfinstitute.org/research/transparencyindex.php. (Linaburg-Maduell transparency index is
a method of rating transparency of SWFs.).
162. See Press Release, Temasek Holdings, Temasek Charter Reiterates Temasek 's Focus on Long-
Term Value, Aug. 25, 2009 available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/news/augeight.php
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/media-centrenewsreleases.250809.htm.
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his concurrence to proceed.'63  Constitutional amendments necessary to
strengthen or amend the President's oversight powers will be subject to
parliamentary debates and must be approved by a two-third majority."*
The public or parties dealing with GIC or Temasek may be able to
apply to Singapore courts for judicial review of investment decisions. This
is based on a possible extension of the administrative law principle that
entities which have public law functions or whose actions have public law
consequences are amenable to judicial review.' This shifts the focus
away from the nature of the body to the impact or consequences of such
bodies' decisions. The functions of such bodies are quasi-judicial'66 in
nature, which attract the duty to act judicially.'67 Courts have therefore
required such decision-makers to adhere to common law principles of fair
procedure and rationality.'68
The Malaysia Court of Appeal recently created three categories of
private companies: first, limited companies (whether public or private)
which perform no public function and are vested with no statutory powers
(e.g., Malaysia Airlines), for which there is no judicial review; second,
hybrid companies which are former public owned service providers that
have been corporatized under a privatization scheme and are owned by
many different persons including the government and perform public
functions regulated by statute (e.g., Malaysian Telekom), for which there
can be judicial review if the company does something or omits to do
something that is ultra vires the powers conferred on it by statute; third,
companies of which the government is the sole shareholder, are funded
entirely with public money and have either statutory powers or duties
conferred upon them (e.g., Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad) for
which there is judicial review of such public functions.' By this
163. For further evaluation and comments on the role and powers of the president, see Thio Li-ann,
Singapore: (S)electing the president - diluting democracy?, 5 INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 526 527-29 (2007);
Yvonne C L Lee, Under Lock and Key: The Evolving Role of the Elected President as a Fiscal
Guardian, SING. J. OF LEGAL ST. 290, 291-93 (2007); MANAGING POLITICAL CHANGE: THE ELECTED
PRESIDENCY OF SINGAPORE (Kevin Y.L. Tan & Lam Peng E eds. 1997).
164. The Singapore Constitution is however rigid only in form. The two-third majority approval is
easily obtained since the ruling party occupies 80 out of 82 seats in Parliament. Forty constitutional
amendment bills have been passed since Singapore's independence in 1965. For detailed analysis of
the supremacy of the Singapore Constitution, see contributions by Jaclyn Neo Ling Chien & Yvonne C
L Lee, Constitutional supremacy: Still a little dicey, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: 40 YEARS OF
THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION (Thio Li-ann & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds, 2009).
165. See, e.g., Regina v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex part Datafin PLC, [1987] 1 Q.B. 815
(the nature of power test applied).
166. E.g., the determination of rights and obligations, and the imposition of sanctions.
167. Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) A.C. 40 (H.L.) (U.K.).
168. See, e.g., Datafin, I Q.B. 815. (the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, an unincorporated
association without statutory prerogative or common law powers was subject to judicial review).
169. Tang Kwor Ham v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd, [2006] 5 M.L.J. 60 (Malyasia Court
of Appeal), overruled on other grounds by Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd v Tang Kwor Ham,
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reasoning, GIC and Temasek fall within the third category and may
therefore be subject to judicial review. However, Singapore courts which
are not bound by foreign case-law, are likely to treat their investment
decisions as involving 'intricate balancing of various competing policy
considerations" and refuse to view the merits of such decisions because
judges are "ill-equipped to adjudicate" given "their limited training
experience and access to materials."' Hence, an application for judicial
review may be denied.
Since 2007, the Singapore government has been addressing issues of
the accountability, transparency (disclosure) and independence of its SWFs
to a greater extent. Several sources have attempted to evaluate SWFs by
formulating measures of accountability and transparency. As there has not
been no detailed analysis of the criteria selection or data relied upon by
such sources, these "scoreboards" merely provide a rough indication of
external perceptions of SWFs. According to Truman's 2007 scoreboard for
SWFs, GIC and Temasek were awarded the 30th and 11th positions out of
32 positions, with scores of 2.25 and 13.5 out of a total score of 25."' A
revised 2008 scoreboard recorded some improvement with GIC and
Temasek receiving scores of 41% and 45% respectively. 7 2 As discussed in
an earlier section, Temasek ranks at the top of the Linaburg-Maduell
Transparency Index (Figure 2). In regard to queries on the SWF debate
and the financial position of Singapore's reserves and investments, the
Singapore Government reiterated that GIC and Temasek "operate
independently of each other and of the Government" with the "single
objective of maximizing the long-term returns on the portfolios, without
any political agenda whatsoever.""' In particular, the Singapore
Government has repeatedly affirmed its general oversight as a shareholder
who does not "influence" or "coordinate" their investments, but "does look
at the risks in totality to ensure that firstly, they are within its overall risk
threshold and that, secondly, GIC and Temasek are likely to be able to
provide Government with good long-term returns on their overall
[2007] 5 M.L.J. 125 (the existence of a statutory ouster clause).
170. See Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publ' Co. Ltd., SGHC 24 at para. 98 (2007) (Sing.).
171. Truman, supra note 36, at 1. (Truman conceded that SWFs exist in different forms with varied
objectives and government structures. Nevertheless, he puts forward a "core set" of 4 elements" being
structure, governance, transparency and accountability, and behavior, that are "substantially relevant for
all such entities whether the objective is short-term macro-economic stabilization, wealth transfer across
generations, or a combination of objectives").
172. Truman, supra note 36, at 1.
173. Lim Hwee Hua, Second Minister for Finance, Budget, 84 PARL. DEB., SG.,(l Ith Ser.) (2008)
1763, available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/get-highlighted content.jsp?doclD=519524&hlLevel=Terms&li
nks=TEMASEK&hlWords=
temasek&hlTitle=&queryOption=1 &ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/2
0080303/20080303_S0003_TOO01.html#l.
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portfolios."'74
The recent sharp fall in the Singapore SWFs' portfolio value has been
subject to scrutiny during the parliamentary debates. Consistent with the
Santiago Principles such as Principles 15, 18 and 19, the Singapore
government has provided public explanations concerning the extent of
losses of GIC and Temasek and their current investment strategies.' Of
particular public interest was Temasek's sale of its stake-holding in Bank
of America (as converted from its Merrill Lynch stake-holding) and
consequent realised losses."' The Singapore government justified the
divestment based on Temasek's reassessment of the risk-return
environment. The government further clarified that Temasek, as a long-
term investor, would regularly reassess the risks and potential returns on its
investments, and rebalance its holdings when it considers necessary to
enhance the long term value of its portfolio."' More recently, in response
to allegations that Temasek's approach towards transparency was
arbitrary,"' the Singapore government emphasized that it adopted "a
principled approach in its disclosures on Temasek Holdings and does not
174. Budget, 84 PARL. DEB., supra note 173.
175. See, e.g., GIC and Temasek Holdings (Losses), 85 PARL. DEB., SG.,(1 Ith Ser.) (2009),,
available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/get-highlighted-content.jsp?doclD=532144&hlLevel=Terms&li
nks=GIC&hlWords=
gic&hlTitle=&queryOption= &ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/20090
119/20090119_S0009_- T0005.html#1; the reply by Senior Minister of State for Finance, Lim Hwee
Hua, Government ofSingapore Investment Corporation, 85 PARL. DEB., SG.,(1 Ith Ser.) (2009),1763,
available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/get-highlighted-contentjsp?doclD=541815&hlLevel=Terms&li
nks=GIC,GIC&hlWords=
gic&hlTitle=&queryOption= &ref-http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/20090
204/20090204_S0005 T0003.html#1. ("The Government's mandate for GIC is to achieve a reasonable
rate of return above global inflation, over a long-term horizon. In the last 20 years to March 2008, the
average annual rate of return of the portfolio was 5.8% in Singapore dollar terms. This was 4.5% above
global inflation.").
176. See, e.g., Temasek raises stake in Merrill Lynch, REUTERS, Sep. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaPrivateEquityNews/idUSTRE48T4FE20080930. Temasek however
converted its 13.7% stake (219.7 million shares) in Merrill Lynch into 189 million shares of Bank of
America. Temasek's Merrill Investment Reduced by More than $2 Bin, REUTERS, Jan. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/asiaMergersNews/idUSBNG27462920090108. See also
Burton, John, Temasek sells entire stake in BofA, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 15, 2009; andTemasek
Holdings, 86 PARL. DEB , supra note 40, and Alvin Foo, Temasek's Barclays stake sold', THE STRAITS
TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jun. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_385671 .html.
("TEMASEK Holdings sold its approximately 2% stake in British banking giant Barclays in December
and January, at an estimated loss of between £500 million (S$1.2 billion) and £600 million, sources
have told The Straits Times").
177. Temasek Holdings, 86 PARL. DEB , supra note 40.
178. Temasek and Transparency - III, The finance minister raises more questions than he answers.
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, at OPINION ASIA available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203550604574359720194516500.html.
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just reveal what it deems acceptable".' 79
In sum, a "model" of overlapping governance and regulation - the
applicable laws and "good practices" at the global, bilateral and domestic
levels, can be drawn from the abovementioned practices of Singapore's
SWFs. The model's pragmatic balance between principles and political
considerations, and the implicit refusal to normatively speak towards the
ordering of the domestic politics of a sovereign state, constitute a plausible
starting point for building consensus, cooperation and coordination among
SWFs and recipient countries.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent contemporary SWF developments, viewed against the
historical backdrop of international law and practice, particularly foreign
investment law and practice, underscore the inter-action between
economics, law and politics. The resort to sovereignty and national
security" arguments demonstrates a politicization and de-economization of
key global and domestic economic issues. Political and economic
considerations, and domestic and international economic norms, interact
and shape one another.
While there has been no evidence confirming the fears of recipient
countries based on perceived risks of "national security" and economic
espionage, the effect of such fears on SWFs which buy and sell based on
their calculated margins of risk and returns and are accountable to their
government stake-holders and popular constituencies (more applicable to
democratic SWF States), remains unclear. Any attempt to regulate SWF
investments beyond the Singapore's SWFs' model, is completely
unrealistic, given the complex and overlapping interests of various States
and non-State actors such as corporations, investors and market
intermediaries. Indeed, the existing vicious circle between politics and
economics within the realm of international investment law, impedes the
establishment of any international law norm governing SWFs and their
investments.
Any viable regulatory or governance response therefore requires
179. See, e.g., Alvin Foo, Principled approach on Temasek disclosures: MOF Ministry rebuts
editorial, says Govt does not just reveal what it deems acceptable, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE),
Aug. 27, 2009, available at available at
http://www.asiaone.comlBusiness/News/My%2BMoney/Story/Al Story200908 2 7-16 38 8 1 .html, and
Press Secretary to Minister for Finance, Singapore, Ministry of Finance replies to Wall Street Journal
article on Temasek, TEMASEK REVIEW (August 26, 2009) at
http://temasekreview.com/index.php?s=Ministry+of+Finance+replies+to+Wall+Street+Journal+article+
on.
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striking a careful balance between the need for foreign capital and the
danger of foreign governments interfering in sensitive sectors of the
economy. Unfortunately, a global economic recession is hardly an
appropriate time for the development of a rational regulatory response. 80
Instead, a synergistic approach towards SWF investments should be
embraced. This entails forging an equilibrium between market liberalism
and nationalism. Recent developments reflecting this idea are the
establishment of a consultative forum pursuant to the Santiago Principles
(2009 Kuwait Declaration), and the voluntary adoption of accountability
and transparency practices by SWF countries such as Singapore. This
demonstrates that SWF Principles constitute a credible starting point of
consultation, cooperation and coordination, that can be effectively utilized
by the relevant actors to achieve some consensus in the controversial global
economic realm.
180. See, e.g., Veljko Fotak & William Megginson, Are SWFs Welcome Now? COLUMBIA FDI
PERSPECTIVES, No. 9, Jul. 21, 2009.
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